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Presidents and War 
Powers  
M A T T H E W  W A X M A N  
Review of Michael Beschloss, “Presidents of War” (Crown Books, 2018) 
 
The U.S. Constitution vests the president 
with “executive power” and provides that 
“The President shall be Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Navy,” while it 
endows Congress with the power “To 
declare War.” These provisions have given 
rise to two major questions about 
presidential war powers: first, what should 
be the president’s role in taking the country 
to war, and, second, what are the 
president’s powers to direct its conduct. 
Historian Michael Beschloss’s new book, 
“Presidents of War,” examines how 
presidents have responded to each of these 
questions across two hundred years of U.S. 
history. His account opens dramatically, 
with President James Madison (something 
of a tragic figure in the book’s telling) 
fleeing as a fugitive while British forces 
proceed to torch the White House in 1814. 
Beschloss goes on to tell the stories of the 
seven individuals who have presided over 
America’s largest wars: James Madison 
and the War of 1812, James Polk and the 
Mexican-American War, William McKinley 
and the Spanish-American War, Woodrow 
Wilson and World War I, Franklin 
Roosevelt and World War II, Harry 
Truman and the Korean War and Lyndon 
Johnson and the Vietnam War. The book 
concludes with a brief epilogue relating 
those stories to recent and ongoing 
conflicts, including the war against al-
Qaeda and its offshoots which is, after 
seventeen years of conflict, America’s 
longest running war.  
The major argument of this book is that 
“the notion of presidential war took hold 
step by step.” (p. 585) By that Beschloss 
means that presidents have gradually 
assumed greater power over decisions to go 
to war—contrary, in his view, to the 
constitutional founders’ vision. That is a 
very familiar story. Although the book does 
succeed in offering some new insights into 
how that accretion of power occurred, its 
more original contribution lies in its 
depictions of how presidents have handled 
and managed the tasks of waging war. 
Those responsibilities for the management 
and supervision in the conduct of America’s 
wars have grown more complex as warfare 
has evolved—and they, too, look nothing 
like what the founders expected or might 
even have imagined.  
The book also puts an important focus on 
the interrelationship between these two 
types of presidential war powers. It 
highlights the continually shifting 
relationship between war-initiation powers 
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and war-waging powers throughout the 
course of American history.   
Taking the Nation to War 
That presidents have, since America’s 
founding, asserted and exercised ever 
wider authority to launch military 
adventures is a well-known story. Scholars 
are most likely to associate the general 
thesis with Arthur Schlesinger’s 
monumental book, “The Imperial 
Presidency.” Beschloss, like Schlesinger, 
sees this growth in presidential power as 
gradual and starting very early in the 
republic’s history. This is in contrast to 
some modern scholars who pin it to the 
onset of the Cold War and especially 
Truman’s 1950 intervention in Korea 
without express congressional 
authorization. Beschloss, too, sees Korea as 
a significant point in this trajectory, but 
one that builds on steps taken by previous 
war presidents like Madison and Polk. 
In telling the story of how each figure 
became a war president, Beschloss avoids 
sweeping theories. Indeed, the pictures he 
paints are quite varied. Madison stumbles 
reluctantly into war, whereas Polk actively 
and deviously manipulates Congress and 
the public into it. McKinley is reactive and 
lacks a clear foreign policy strategy, 
whereas Franklin Roosevelt adroitly and 
incrementally moves the United States 
into World War II, foreseeing grave 
dangers that the public is not yet willing to 
confront if he does not. Wilson, though he 
had theorized as a scholar about the need 
for presidents to assert broad foreign policy 
power, showed little appetite to embroil the 
United States militarily, whereas Truman 
believed that freedom of military action 
was important to containing the Soviet 
bloc. Personal, political, bureaucratic and 
geostrategic factors all play roles in the 
stories of “presidential war.” This is a 
phrase that then-Senator Daniel Webster 
used to characterize the Mexican-American 
War in 1846 and one that Beschloss adopts 
to describe prevailing constitutional 
practice. 
Beschloss shows throughout this account 
that war presidents look to predecessors for 
lessons—including mistakes to avoid. Most 
of those lessons seemed to be practical ones 
rather than reflections about constitutional 
principle. An implication is that power and 
constitutional law cannot be meaningfully 
separated in this area. 
Having framed the book in terms of the 
Constitution, however, I wondered 
throughout my reading it just how 
consciously, or conscientiously, these 
presidents felt obliged to abide by either 
the founders’ design or prior presidents’ 
interpretations of it. Or, for that matter, 
how consciously they felt constrained by a 
sense that they were establishing 
constitutional justifications that would be 
relied upon by their presidential 
successors. Because Beschloss is so capable 
of getting inside the minds of presidents, I 
would have liked to hear more on this—if, 
in fact, the war presidents struggled much 
with these issues. 
Take, for example, Beschloss’s twist on the 
usual story of Madison and the War of 
1812. Most scholars of war powers, 
including Schlesinger, characterize 
Madison as pushed reluctantly into the war 
by congressional “War Hawks” (thus 
quickly turning on its head many founders’ 
supposition that presidents would incline 
toward war while Congress would 
generally incline against it). Although 
Beschloss admires Madison as a hero of 
constitutional drafting, he gives Madison 
mixed grades in applying the Constitution 
to war. He is especially tough on Madison’s 
1812 move to solicit Congress’s declaration 
that war existed with Great Britain. 
Madison, Beschloss says, designed the 
Constitution to avoid war except in cases of 
absolute necessity and with broad public 
support. By going to Congress for a war 
declaration in 1812, however, he violated 
both of those criteria: “By leading his 
country into a major war that had no 
absolute necessity or overwhelming 
support from Congress and the public, 
Madison, of all people, had opened the door 
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for later Presidents to seek involvement in 
future conflicts that suffered from such 
shortcomings.” (p. 5)  
Later in the book, Beschloss reiterates this 
point, with a distinct emphasis on how 
actions of a president in a given would 
almost inevitably create precedents for 
future presidents and, importantly, thus 
create over time institutional 
interpretations of the Constitution:  
As one of the chief architects of the 
American system, Madison knew that 
the nature of the first major war to be 
fought under any President would do 
much to shape how often and how lightly 
the nation went to war in the future—
and that engaging in this conflict would 
mean relaxing the established standard 
in Philadelphia. (p. 60) 
But we might pause and ask: did Madison 
view it this way, and how exactly did 
Madison’s actions make it easier for future 
presidents to lead the country into war?  
Madison eases his own conscience about 
presidential war by asking Congress to 
declare that a state of war already 
existed—rather than urging Congress to 
declare war. Apparently even he—the 
great constitutionalist Madison—was 
willing to sidestep constitutional 
formalities for war when he deemed it 
expedient. Beschloss’s assessment 
additionally seems to imply that had 
Madison resisted the war hawks, the 
founders’ original vision might have held 
up better. I question this, though, after 
reading the book’s later chapters. I doubt, 
for example, that Polk would have behaved 
any differently in provoking war with 
Mexico in 1846, or that McKinley would not 
still have succumbed to war frenzy against 
Spain in 1898. It is undoubtedly true that 
presidents have, over time, engaged in 
wars for reasons that many founders would 
have opposed—reasons well short of 
absolute necessity. But changing 
thresholds and justifications for war over 
the very long run of American history 
probably had more to do, it seems to me, 
with expanding national power and 
broader changes in American foreign policy 
than with interpretation of constitutional 
dictates or ethics, including those arising 
from the supposed weight of precedents. 
The two presidents who Beschloss 
describes as thinking most consciously 
about the precedents they were setting for 
successors are Lincoln and Truman. Yet 
there is more than a bit of irony in both 
cases. Lincoln, knowing that the Civil War 
was a unique threat to the Republic, 
wanted to avoid setting precedent—and, 
yet, the wartime moves he made have been 
cited often since then to support 
presidential war powers. Truman may 
have been the one most attentive to 
precedent he was setting—but the 
precedent he wanted to set ran counter the 
founders’ vision. Beschloss describes how 
Truman calculatingly preferred not to get 
congressional authorization for the Korean 
War, in part because he believed that the 
Cold War required less-encumbered 
presidential agility to use military force. 
He also describes how Truman, more than 
other presidents, consulted history to guide 
him in tough decisions. A predecessor he 
admired for his presidential initiative was 
none other than Polk, who stands out as 
the greatest anti-hero of the book. Truman 
regarded constitutional architect Madison 
as weak and indecisive. But he admired 
Polk because, in his words, he “regularly 
told Congress to go to hell on foreign policy 
matters.” (p. 462)  
The book’s war presidents agonized about 
a lot of things in going to war. 
Constitutional law does not seem to have 
been one of them. 
Directing War 
Beschloss laments that the “Founders 
would probably be thunderstruck” to 
discover modern presidents’ power to 
initiate major military conflicts (p. 586). I 
think they would also be thunderstruck to 
discover how much power presidents have 
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wielded in waging war, including vast 
authority delegated by Congress pursuant 
to its own expansive war powers. Lincoln 
wielded wartime powers over the economy, 
slaves, conscripts and dissenters that 
would have shocked most founders. Wilson 
took those types of powers to a new level, 
and then Roosevelt did so to a greater level 
still. Although Madison and many founders 
feared standing armies, Truman built a 
“permanent war machine.” (p. 434)  
This book does a lot to show the many 
essential elements of the president’s 
commander-in-chief function. We know 
generally what the founders did not want 
presidents to do in war—which was to seize 
tyrannical power. We know relatively little 
about what they wanted presidents to do in 
conducting war, though.  
One virtue that Beschloss emphasizes is 
some presidents’ ability to maintain control 
over war strategy, sometimes even against 
the strong recommendation of military 
leaders. The chapters on Lincoln stress 
how that president learned to balance and 
coordinate Civil War military strategy with 
political strategy. Beschloss gives 
significant treatment to Truman’s sacking 
of General Douglas MacArthur during the 
Korean War, after the president lost faith 
in the general’s willingness to follow 
civilian strategic guidance. And one of the 
most remarkable, if brief, moments is when 
President Johnson rejects General William 
Westmoreland’s planning for possible use 
of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. 
These episodes call to mind Eliot Cohen’s 
terrific book on civil-military relations, 
“Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, 
and Leadership in Wartime,” which argues 
that the greatest wartime statesmen 
actively question and even sometimes defy 
military advice.  
Another aspect of waging war in which 
presidential leadership over time became 
especially crucial is preparing for and 
managing the peace that follows. Beschloss 
astutely highlights this function with the 
sharply contrasting stories around the 
middle of the book: McKinley was caught 
off guard by the challenges of managing a 
global empire after deciding to keep the 
Philippines; Wilson had grand visions for a 
new international order but failed 
miserably to build domestic support for it 
at home; and Franklin Roosevelt laid the 
military, diplomatic and political 
groundwork for a postwar order (although 
that architecture would need to be adapted 
to the Cold War). As important as they 
became, these imperative post-conflict 
aspects of waging war were probably far 
from the minds of most constitutional 
founders. 
Among the other lessons Beschloss draws 
is that the best wartime presidents are able 
to explain effectively war stakes and 
strategy to the public as well as to match 
war aims with higher moral imperatives. 
Here again he points to Lincoln and 
Roosevelt as models, especially compared 
to their prior war presidents, Polk and 
Wilson, respectively. Note, however, that if 
Beschloss is correct that the founders 
expected war to be waged only in cases of 
immediate and grave national danger and 
only with overwhelming public support, 
once again, these considerations would not 
have seemed to them likely priorities for 
war presidents. 
Interlocking War Powers 
As these last points suggest, by discussing 
together both how presidents have taken 
the nation to war and how they have 
managed it, Beschloss underscores the 
ever-shifting relationship between those 
powers, and how generally the founders 
intended, or failed to consider adequately, 
how various constitutional war powers 
would fit together.  
For example, Beschloss emphasizes that a 
major worry of the constitutional founders 
was that fame, glory and aggrandizement 
of power in directing wars might tempt 
presidents, like “the European despots they 
abhorred,” to launch them. (p. 586) In other 
words, power in war would affect 
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proneness to war. This was a weighty 
argument in lodging the power to declare 
war—or most would say, more broadly, to 
initiate war—in Congress. There is some 
intuitive logic here, although I think many 
founders under-estimated the problem that 
wars can result from too little military 
power or willingness to use it, not just from 
too much.  
Moreover, this arrangement raises another 
constitutional design question: if the 
Constitution was designed to ensure that 
wars would be rare, was it also designed to 
ensure that the president would 
nevertheless be an effective wartime leader 
in those rare instances? The founders seem 
to have given relatively little thought to 
that latter question, perhaps because they 
expected the first president to be George 
Washington—by far the best wartime 
leader available. And they did not expect it 
to matter very much so long as they got the 
former issue right (that is, by designing the 
Constitution to help keep the United States 
out of wars to begin with).  
But the United States has engaged in many 
wars, and Beschloss’s book is a reminder 
that in the most important wars of 
survival—the Civil War and World War 
II—the United States had its most superb 
wartime leaders in Lincoln and Roosevelt. 
Was that just luck? It is hard for me to give 
much credit to constitutional design for 
this, especially given that in neither case 
was each elected by a public interested in 
war, Lincoln was a dark horse candidate 
altogether, and Roosevelt became a war 
president while serving longer than many 
founders likely would have approved.  
Finally, although “Presidents of War” 
argues that many constitutional 
constraints devised to avoid war have been 
gutted over the course of American history, 
the war presidents it depicts are rarely 
war-mongers like those the founders most 
feared. With the exception of Polk, none of 
the featured presidents sought war. Some 
came out publicly glorified, but all the war 
presidents of this book were tormented and 
damaged physically and mentally by the 
pressures of war. They were almost all 
reluctant commanders-in-chief. 
Does that mean that the constitutional 
design has somehow succeeded—whether 
because of or despite accumulating war 
powers in the presidency? My own 
intuition—one reinforced by this book—is 
that the American Constitution generally 
deserves much credit for the nation’s 
security and prosperity over time, but that 
the declare war clause and formal powers 
to initiate war have always been less 
important to that story than other still 
more basic constitutional features. 
Matthew C. Waxman is the Liviu Librescu 
Professor of Law and the faculty chair of the 
National Security Law Program at Columbia 
Law School. 
 
Cite as: Matthew Waxman, Presidents and 
War Powers, (Nov. 15, 2018) 
http://lawfareblog.com/presidents-and-
war-powers/.
 
